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ELEVENTH CIRCUIT PREMATURELY 
APPLIED THE RULE OF LENITY IN  
UNITED STATES v. IZURIETA 
Abstract: The statute that prohibits smuggling goods into the United States, 
18 U.S.C. § 545, requires proof that a defendant knowingly or fraudulently 
imported merchandise or facilitated the transport of such merchandise “con-
trary to law.” In 2013, in United States v. Izurieta, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit held that a regulatory violation carrying only civil 
implications could not serve as the underlying offense for the smuggling stat-
ute’s contrary to law provision given the felony criminal penalties associated 
with a violation of the statute. The Eleventh Circuit’s decision diverged from 
the 1994 and 2008 decisions of the Fourth and the Ninth Circuits in United 
States v. Mitchell and United States v. Alghazouli, respectively, which each 
outlined a different test for how regulations should be treated under the smug-
gling statute’s contrary to law provision. In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit ap-
plied the rule of lenity, granting leniency to the defendant because the criminal 
statute was found to be “grievously ambiguous” after the court attempted to 
interpret the statute using traditional canons of statutory construction. This 
Comment argues that the Eleventh Circuit prematurely applied the rule of len-
ity in Izurieta before properly conducting an analysis of the text, history, and 
structure of the statute. 
INTRODUCTION 
Smuggling goods into the United States is a criminal offense charged 
under 18 U.S.C. § 545 (the “smuggling statute”).1 To successfully prosecute 
an individual or commercial importer under the smuggling statute, a prose-
cutor must demonstrate that a defendant knowingly or fraudulently import-
ed merchandise “contrary to law” or facilitated the concealment or transpor-
tation of merchandise knowing it to have been imported “contrary to law.”2 
An indictment for a violation of the smuggling statute must, therefore, al-
                                                                                                                           
 1 18 U.S.C. § 545 (2018) (the “smuggling statute”); see also Jane C. Avery, Annotation, Validi-
ty, Construction, and Application of Federal Statutory Provision (Under 18 U.S.C.A. § 545 and Simi-
lar Predecessor Statutes) Making It Offense to Smuggle or Clandestinely Introduce into United 
States Merchandise Which Should Have Been Invoiced, 20 A.L.R. Fed. 410, 1c (1974) (outlining the 
legislative history of the smuggling statute and providing annotated cases in which it has been ap-
plied). 
 2 18 U.S.C. § 545. 
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lege a particular law that has been violated underlying the offense.3 The U.S 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have diverged 
over the meaning of the term “law” as it is used in the smuggling statute.4 
In 2013, in United States v. Izurieta, the Eleventh Circuit held that a 
regulatory violation that carried only civil penalties could not serve as the 
underlying offense for an indictment under the smuggling statute.5 The 
court cited the common law rule of lenity, in which leniency is extended to 
defendants in cases where a criminal statute is “grievously ambiguous,” and 
found that the smuggling statute’s contrary to law provision was unaccepta-
bly ambiguous in its effect of criminalizing conduct that would otherwise be 
subject only to civil penalties.6 The Eleventh Circuit’s ruling departed from 
prior rulings in the Fourth and Ninth Circuits regarding what constitutes a 
law under the smuggling statute.7 
In 1994, in United States v. Mitchell, the Fourth Circuit held that a reg-
ulatory violation could serve as the underlying offense of an indictment un-
der the smuggling statute if the regulation carried “the force and effect of 
law.”8 The Fourth Circuit’s analysis focused on a textual interpretation of 
the term law and the Supreme Court’s 1976 decision in Chrysler Corp. v. 
Brown.9 In Chrysler Corp., the Court articulated a three-part test to deter-
mine whether agency regulations have the force and effect of law.10 In con-
trast, in 2008, in United States v. Alghazouli, the Ninth Circuit held that a 
regulation can form the underlying offense of an indictment under the 
smuggling statute only if Congress has specified that a violation of that reg-
                                                                                                                           
 3 See Steiner v. United States, 229 F.2d 745, 748 (9th Cir. 1956) (finding that a conviction under 
18 U.S.C. § 545 was improper as the government failed to state what law had been violated with 
respect to the statute’s “contrary to law” provision); see also United States v. Thian Teh, 535 F.3d 
511, 517 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding that the government failed to charge an offense by omitting which 
law had been violated when charging a defendant under the smuggling statute). This did not consti-
tute plain error upon review as the defendant failed to object, and the error was not prejudicial. Thian 
Teh, 535 F.3d at 517. 
 4 See United States v. Izurieta, 710 F.3d 1176, 1182–84 (11th Cir. 2013) (finding the contrary to 
law provision as it pertains to 19 C.F.R. § 141.113(c)(3) (2017) “grievously ambiguous” and apply-
ing the rule of lenity); United States v. Alghazouli, 517 F.3d 1179, 1187 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that 
the term “law” in the smuggling statute includes a regulation only if Congress has specified that a 
violation of that regulation would be a crime); United States v. Mitchell, 39 F.3d 465, 470–71 (4th 
Cir. 1994) (holding that a regulation is a law for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 545 if it has the “force and 
effect of law”). 
 5 Izurieta, 710 F.3d at 1182–84 (citing Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 463 (1991)). 
 6 Id. 
 7 See id. at 1181 (finding the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Alghazouli unpersuasive and the 
Fourth Circuit’s ruling in Mitchell too broad to settle the dispute at issue in Izurieta). 
 8 Mitchell, 39 F.3d at 470–71. 
 9 Id. (citing Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 295–96 (1976)). 
 10 Id. at 468–69. 
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ulation is a crime.11 The Ninth Circuit’s approach emphasized a historical 
analysis of the smuggling statute’s contrary to law provision, focusing on 
how the text of the statute differed from other customs and border protec-
tion statutes.12 Rather than reach a broad conclusion defining the limits of 
the contrary to law provision in the smuggling statute, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit’s application of the rule of lenity in Izurieta resulted in a narrow ruling, 
principally resolving ambiguity in the statute as it pertained to the regula-
tion the defendants in Izurieta allegedly violated.13 
This Comment argues that the Eleventh Circuit prematurely applied the 
rule of lenity in Izurieta as the court failed to first exhaust all other means of 
statutory interpretation before finding the smuggling statute grievously am-
biguous and granting the defendants leniency.14 This Comment further argues 
that the Eleventh Circuit’s mistaken application of the rule of lenity over-
stepped the court’s role as an interpreter of congressional will by resorting 
to the rule of lenity to the detriment of established methods of statutory in-
terpretation.15 Part I of this Comment reviews the relevant legislative histo-
ry of the smuggling statute and the factual background of Izurieta.16 Part II 
analyzes the existing circuit split, highlighting the contrasting approaches of 
the Fourth and Ninth Circuits in Alghazouli and Mitchell, respectively, with 
the Eleventh Circuit’s approach in Izurieta.17 Part III argues that the Eleventh 
Circuit misapplied the rule of lenity in Izurieta by finding the contrary to law 
provision of the smuggling statute grievously ambiguous and resorting to len-
ity before exhausting all available means of statutory interpretation.18 
                                                                                                                           
 11 Alghazouli, 517 F.3d at 1187. 
 12 See id. (finding that the terms “law” as applied in 18 U.S.C. § 545 and “law and regulation” as 
applied in 18 U.S.C. § 554 could not be equivalent in light of the close affiliation of the two statutes). 
 13 Izurieta, 710 F.3d at 1181. 
 14 See Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990) (finding that resort to the rule of lenity 
is reserved for instances in which doubt exists about a statute’s intended scope even after examining 
the language, structure, and legislative history of the statute); Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 
587, 596 (1961) (finding that the rule of lenity is applied at the end of the process of statutory inter-
pretation, not at the beginning as a means of offering a defendant leniency). 
 15 See Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 831 (1974) (holding that furtherance of the 
principles underlying the rule of lenity should not lead the court to dictate, where it otherwise might 
interpret, congressional authority). 
 16 See infra notes 19–52 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 53–83 and accompanying text.  
 18 See infra notes 84–122 and accompanying text. 
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I. THE SMUGGLING STATUTE AND IZURIETA  
Courts often resolve questions regarding statutory ambiguity through 
an examination of the statute’s legislative history.19 In Izurieta, the Eleventh 
Circuit failed to employ the traditional canons of statutory interpretation 
often employed by courts to decipher legislative intent.20 Section A of this 
Part traces the legislative history of the smuggling statute, focusing on how 
little the statute and the statute’s contrary to law provision have changed 
since 1866.21 Section B discusses the factual background and the court’s 
analysis in Izurieta.22 
A. Legislative History of the Smuggling Statute 
The smuggling statute in force today, 18 U.S.C. § 545, was enacted in 
1948.23 The statute is derived, however, from Section Four of the Tariff Act 
of 1866, which was enacted for the purpose of preventing the importation of 
smuggled goods into the United States.24 The language of Section Four in 
many ways tracks the smuggling statute in force today, prohibiting fraudu-
lent or knowing importation of goods contrary to law and the facilitation of 
the concealment or transportation of goods known to have been imported 
contrary to law.25 The Tariff Act was re-enacted in both 1922 and 1930, with 
the contrary to law provision remaining in force.26 The enactment of the 
smuggling statute in 1948 repealed the smuggling provision enacted in the 
                                                                                                                           
 19 See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1077 (2015) (rejecting a proposed interpre-
tation of a “tangible object” as defined by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act by applying the traditional tools of 
statutory construction). See generally Victoria F. Nourse, Elementary Statutory Interpretation: Re-
thinking Legislative Intent and History, 55 B.C.L. REV. 1613, 1627–32 (2014). 
 20 See Izurieta, 710 F.3d at 1181 (finding the contrary to law provision as it pertains to 
§ 141.113(c)(3) grievously ambiguous and applying the rule of lenity before employing traditional 
canons of statutory construction). 
 21 See infra notes 23–29 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 30–52 and accompanying text. 
 23 An Act to Revise, Codify, and Enact into Positive Law, Title 18 of the United States Code, 
Entitled “Crimes and Criminal Procedure,” ch. 645, Pub. L. No. 772, 62 Stat. 683, 716 (1948) (codi-
fied at 18 U.S.C. § 545). 
 24 An Act Further to Prevent Smuggling and for Other Purposes (Tariff Act of 1866), ch. 201, 
§ 4, 14 Stat. 178, 179; Alghazouli, 517 F.3d at 1186 (tracing the legislative history of the smuggling 
statute to § 4 of the Tariff Act of 1866). 
 25 Compare § 4, 14 Stat. at 179 (“That if any person shall fraudulently or knowingly import or 
bring into the United States, or assist in so doing, any goods, wares, or merchandise, contrary to law 
. . . .”), with 18 U.S.C. § 545 (“Whoever fraudulently or knowingly imports or brings into the United 
States, any merchandise contrary to law . . . .”). 
 26 See Alghazouli, 517 F.3d at 1186 n.2 (finding that § 4 of the Tariff Act of 1866 was re-enacted 
in nearly its identical form in the Tariff Act of 1922 and the Tariff Act of 1930). 
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Tariff Act of 1930, but retained the language of the prior statute, including 
the contrary to law provision.27 
Since the enactment of the smuggling statute in 1948, the statute has 
been amended several times, most notably in 1954 and 2006, to increase the 
penalties associated with a violation of the statute.28 Congress has not, how-
ever, amended or clarified the statute’s contrary to law provision since the 
statute’s enactment in 1948.29 
B. Factual Background of Izurieta 
Yuri and Anneri Izurieta founded Naver Trading Corp., a company that 
imported dairy products and bread from Central America.30 The Izurietas 
were charged with smuggling goods into the United States in violation of 
the smuggling statute for acts committed in relation to Naver Trading 
Corp.’s business.31 As the basis for this charge, the government alleged that 
the Izurietas violated 19 C.F.R. § 141.113(c)(3) and that this regulatory vio-
lation amounted to a form of concealing or transporting merchandise known 
to have been imported contrary to law as defined by the smuggling statute.32 
The Izurietas’ regulatory violation amounted to an importer’s failure to 
comply with Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) and Customs and 
Border Protection (“CBP”) inspections as required under the Conditional 
Release Period and CBP Bond Obligations for Food, Drugs, Devices, and 
Cosmetics.33 If the FDA refuses admission of a good into the United States, 
                                                                                                                           
 27 See § 716, 62 Stat. at 683; Avery, supra note 1 (noting that the anti-smuggling provision in-
cluded in the Tariff Act of 1930 was repealed upon the enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 545 in 1948).  
 28 See USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109–177, § 310, 
120 Stat. 192, 242 (2006) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 545) (increasing the potential sentence resulting 
from a conviction under the smuggling statute from five to twenty years); Act of Aug. 24, 1954, ch. 
890, Pub. L. No. 83–641, § 1, 68 Stat. 782 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 545) (increasing the potential fine 
associated with smuggling from $5,000 to $10,000 and the possible sentence from two to five years). 
 29 See Alghazouli, 517 F.3d at 1186–87 (finding that Congress re-enacted the smuggling statute’s 
contrary to law provision repeatedly, knowing that the term law as used in the statute was not analo-
gous to the phrase law and regulation used in 18 U.S.C. § 554). 
 30 Izurieta, 710 F.3d at 1178. 
 31 Id. The Izurietas were also charged with conspiracy to smuggle goods into the United States in 
violation of 18 U.S.C § 371. Id. 
 32 See id. at 1179 (explaining that charges two through seven of the indictment were premised on 
an alleged failure to deliver, export, and destroy, with Food and Drug Administration (FDA) supervi-
sion, merchandise found to have been contaminated in violation of § 141.113(c)). 
 33 See id. (describing the applicability of § 141.113(c)(3) to the indictment). Section 141.113(c)(3) 
has been in force in its current form since 2007. Conditional Release Period and CBP Bond Obliga-
tions for Food, Drugs, Devices, and Cosmetics, 72 Fed. Reg. 4423, 4429 (Jan. 31, 2007) (codified at 
19 C.F.R. § 141.113). The FDA and Customers and Border Protection (“CBP”) permit importers to 
possess their goods under conditional release pending test results or further inspection, provided the 
goods are held pursuant to a bond or other security as prescribed by 19 U.S.C. § 1499(a)(1). Izurieta, 
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CBP will demand the re-delivery of the product to CBP custody.34 Under 
the regulation, a failure to comply with a demand for re-delivery may result 
in an assessment of liquidated damages equal to three times the value of the 
merchandise recalled.35 
The indictment against the Izurietas alleging a violation of the smug-
gling statute specifically charged the Izurietas with failing to re-deliver five 
contaminated shipments to CBP custody to be destroyed.36 The indictment 
also charged the Izurietas with failing to hold one shipment and making it 
available for inspection.37 Each of smuggling charges were premised on 
violations of § 141.113(c)(3).38 The Izurietas were convicted in the U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of Florida of all counts related to the 
smuggling charges after a jury trial.39 They appealed their convictions on 
the grounds that the proceedings violated their Sixth Amendment right to 
confront witnesses and that the prosecutor made improper statements during 
trial.40 
On appeal, at oral argument, the Eleventh Circuit sua sponte raised the 
question of whether the indictment that led to the Izurietas’ smuggling con-
victions charged a federal crime, thereby granting the court subject-matter 
jurisdiction over the case.41 The court specifically questioned whether a 
                                                                                                                           
710 F.3d at 1178. At such time, however, the goods are placed on hold and may not enter the U.S. 
market until authorization is provided by the FDA pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 381. Id. 
 34 See Izurieta, 710 F.3d at 1178 (providing contextual background regarding CBP and FDA 
requirements for importers). 
 35 § 141.113(c)(3); see Liquidated Damages, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (de-
fining liquidated damages as “an amount contractually stipulated as a reasonable estimation of actual 
damages to be recovered by one party if the other party breaches”). 
 36 Izurieta, 710 F.3d at 1178 n.3 (noting that the Izurietas stipulated for trial that the shipments in 
question had been contaminated with bacteria such as E. coli, Staphylococcus aureus, and Salmonel-
la). 
 37 Id. at 1178. 
 38 Id. at 1179. 
 39 Id. at 1178. 
 40 Id. 
 41 See id. at 1178–79 (questioning whether an indictment for smuggling premised on a violation 
of § 141.113(c)(3) sufficiently charges a crime). Without the Izurietas having been charged with a 
federal crime, neither the district nor appellate court would have had subject matter jurisdiction to 
hear the case because the court did not otherwise have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331 (2018); see MOORE’S MANUAL: FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5.03 (2017) (stating 
that the original subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts is limited to two types of claims—those 
arising under the U.S. constitution or federal laws (federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331) and those involving an amount in controversy in excess of $75,000 and parties from different 
states (diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332)); Sua Sponte, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(10th ed. 2014) (defining sua sponte as “without prompting or suggestion” or “on its own motion”); 
Subject Matter Jurisdiction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining subject matter 
jurisdiction as “jurisdiction over the nature of the case and the type of relief sought” or “the extent to 
which a court can rule on the conduct of persons or the status of things”). 
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failure to comply with § 141.113(c)(3), which typically gives rise to a civil 
remedy and not criminal punishment, fell within the ambit of a law as de-
fined by the smuggling statute which imposes criminal penalties.42 
In 1994, in Mitchell, the Fourth Circuit held that a regulatory violation 
could serve as the underlying offense for an indictment under the smuggling 
statute if the regulation carried the force and effect of law.43 In contrast, in 
2008, in Alghazouli, the Ninth Circuit held that a regulation could form the 
underlying offense for an indictment under the smuggling statute only if 
there is an existing statute specifying that the violation of that regulation is 
a crime.44 The Eleventh Circuit departed from the approaches of both the 
Fourth and Ninth Circuits and instead looked strictly at the regulation at 
issue in Izurieta.45 This analysis led the Eleventh Circuit to find it unneces-
sary to reach such sweeping rulings as the Fourth or Ninth Circuits with 
implications beyond the regulation at issue before the court.46 Rather, the 
court applied the common law rule of lenity, construing the contrary to law 
provision narrowly so as not to include the regulation at issue in Izurieta. 47 
The rule of lenity is premised on two principles: (1) that criminal de-
fendants are given fair notice, through the plain words in a statute, of what the 
law intends to do when a crime is committed; and (2) that legislatures, and 
not courts, should define criminal activity.48 The rule requires that where stat-
utory ambiguity remains after considering the text, structure, and purpose of a 
criminal statute, any ambiguity should be resolved in favor of a defendant.49 
The application of the rule, however, is narrow; the rule of lenity is only ap-
plied where courts find that there is a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the 
statute.50 The Eleventh Circuit cited the Supreme Court’s 1991 decision in 
Chapman v. United States as authority for the finding that the smuggling stat-
ute’s contrary to law provision is grievously ambiguous.51 Applying the prin-
                                                                                                                           
 42 See Izurieta, 710 F.3d at 1178–79 (raising, sua sponte, the question of whether the Izurietas’ 
indictment sufficiently charged a crime). 
 43 Mitchell, 39 F.3d 465, 470–71. 
 44 See Alghazouli, 517 F.3d at 1187 (holding that the term law in the smuggling statute includes 
a regulation only if Congress has specified that a violation of that regulation would be a crime). 
 45 Izurieta, 710 F.3d at 1181–82. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. at 1182. 
 49 Id. (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971)); see Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 
474, 488 (2010) (holding that the rule of lenity only applies if a grievous ambiguity still exists after 
the text, legislative history, and purpose of a statute have been examined). 
 50 Izurieta, 710 F.3d at 1182 (quoting Chapman, 500 U.S. at 456). 
 51 Id. 
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ciples of lenity, the court resolved the ambiguity in the statute in favor of the 
Izurietas and vacated their convictions under the smuggling statute.52 
II. CIRCUITS DISPUTE THE MEANING OF “LAW” IN  
THE SMUGGLING STATUTE 
 The smuggling statute does not directly specify which regulations, if 
any, can form the basis of an indictment under the statute.53 In 1994, the 
Fourth Circuit confronted this ambiguity in United States v. Mitchell and 
found that the contrary to law provision in the statute included any regula-
tion that carried the force and effect of law.54 In 2008, in United States v. 
Alghazouli, the Ninth Circuit came to an alternative conclusion, finding that 
a regulation could serve as an underlying offense for a smuggling indict-
ment only if Congress clearly intended a violation of the regulation to carry 
criminal penalties.55 In 2013, in United States v. Izurieta, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit expressly disagreed with the approaches of the Ninth and Fourth Cir-
cuits as applied to the regulation at issue in Izurieta.56  
Section A of this Part discusses the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation of the 
contrary to law provision of the smuggling statute in Mitchell, and Section B 
examines the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the statue in Alghazouli.57 Sec-
tion C examines the Eleventh Circuit’s decision to apply the rule of lenity in 
Izurieta rather than follow the approaches of the Fourth or Ninth Circuit.58 
                                                                                                                           
 52 See id. at 1182–84 (finding the contrary to law provision as it pertains to § 141.113(c)(3) 
grievously ambiguous and applying the rule of lenity). Finding that the sole remaining count of the 
seven-count indictment was based primarily on conspiracy to commit the crime alleged in counts two 
through seven, the Eleventh Circuit likewise vacated the Izurietas’ conviction of conspiracy under 18 
U.S.C. § 371. Id. at 1184–85. 
 53 18 U.S.C. § 545 (2018); see Steiner v. United States, 229 F.2d 745, 748 (9th Cir. 1956) (find-
ing that a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 545 was improper as the government failed to state what law 
had been violated with respect to the statute’s contrary to law provision). 
 54 See United States v. Mitchell, 39 F.3d 465, 470–71 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that a regulation 
is a law for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 545 if it has the force and effect of law). 
 55 See United States v. Alghazouli, 517 F.3d 1179, 1187 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the term 
law in the smuggling statute includes a regulation only if Congress has specified that a violation of 
that regulation would be a crime). 
 56 See United States v. Izurieta, 710 F.3d 1176, 1182–84 (11th Cir. 2013) (disagreeing with the 
conclusions of the Fourth and Ninth Circuits and finding that the smuggling statute is grievously 
ambiguous as it pertains to the regulation at issue, 19 C.F.R. § 141.113(c)(3) (2017), and that the rule 
of lenity should therefore apply). 
 57 See infra notes 59–66 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 67–75 and accompanying 
text. 
 58 See infra notes 76–83 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Fourth Circuit’s Approach: “Force of Law” 
In Mitchell, an American hunter returning from Africa was charged 
under the smuggling statute after allegedly transporting exotic animal hides 
and horns into the United States and failing to declare the products or com-
plete applicable paperwork.59 The Fourth Circuit found that the term law in 
the smuggling statute was not defined and thus sought to apply the word’s 
plain meaning.60 In doing so, the court scrutinized the Supreme Court’s 
1976 decision in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, in which the Court held that the 
term law included regulations having the force and effect of law. 61 There, 
the Court established a three-prong test for determining whether a regula-
tion carries the force and effect of law.62 For a regulation to have the force 
and effect of law, it must be (1) a substantive or legislative type rule as op-
posed to a general statement of policy or rule of agency organization or pro-
cedure; (2) promulgated in conformity with congressionally-imposed pro-
cedural requirements, such as the notice and comment provisions of the 
Administrative Procedure Act; and (3) issued pursuant to delegated legisla-
tive authority.63 The Fourth Circuit employed the Chrysler Corp. test to the 
regulations at issue in Mitchell—three regulations that had been violated as 
a result of the appellant’s undeclared importation of animal hides—and 
found that each carried the force and effect of law under the test.64 
The Fourth Circuit’s analysis of the contrary to law provision led the 
court to conclude that Congress clearly intended the provision only to in-
clude administrative regulations that carry the force and effect of law; thus, 
the court found the provision unambiguous.65 This conclusion drove the 
court to note that the rule of lenity was inapplicable to the defendants in 
Mitchell because the rule does not apply unless a grievous ambiguity re-
mains after a court looks at a statute’s language, structure, and history.66 
                                                                                                                           
 59 Mitchell, 39 F.3d at 470–71. The defendant was specifically charged with smuggling after he 
failed to (1) declare the items to a customs officer as required by 19 C.F.R. § 148.11 (1987); (2) file a 
completed form required by the Fish and Wildlife Services of the U.S. Department of the Interior as 
prescribed by 50 C.F.R. § 14.61 (1986); and (3) identify the country of origin of the hides and horns 
to the Deputy Administrator of Veterinary Services as required by 9 C.F.R. § 95.2 (1987). Id. at 467. 
 60 Id. at 468–69. 
 61 See id. (finding that “properly promulgated, substantive agency regulations have the ‘force 
and effect of law’”) (citing Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 295–96 (1976)). 
 62 See Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. at 301–03. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Mitchell, 39 F.3d at 470–71. 
 65 Id. at 470. 
 66 See id. (finding the rule of lenity inapplicable to the smuggling statute because it is not griev-
ously ambiguous) (citing Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 463 (1991)). 
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B. The Ninth Circuit’s Approach: Clear Legislative Intent 
of Criminal Punishment 
The Ninth Circuit adopted a narrower reading of the smuggling stat-
ute’s contrary to law provision in Alghazouli.67 The court found that Con-
gress intended the term law to include a regulation only when a statute 
specifies that a violation of that regulation constitutes a crime.68 In reaching 
this conclusion, the court examined Supreme Court precedent involving 
prior iterations of the Tariff Act.69 The court found that the Supreme Court 
had applied caution in imposing criminal penalties where the underlying 
violation was regulatory in nature and did not provide clear notice of possi-
ble criminal implications.70 The court further reasoned that in re-enacting 
the smuggling statute against the backdrop of these cases, Congress intend-
ed that a criminal prohibition against violating a law include a criminal pro-
hibition against violating a regulation only where the statute clearly speci-
fies that a violation of that regulation carries criminal, not civil, penalties.71 
The Ninth Circuit also examined 18 U.S.C. § 554, which was codified 
through the amendment of the smuggling statute in 2006 as part of the USA 
PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.72 Section 554 im-
poses criminal penalties for the fraudulent and otherwise improper export of 
goods from the United States and largely traces the language of the smug-
gling statute.73 Unlike the smuggling statute, which prohibits only viola-
tions of law, § 554 prohibits the violation of any law or regulation.74 The 
court concluded that the term law in the smuggling statute is not synony-
mous with the more expansive phrase law and regulation in § 554 and 
                                                                                                                           
 67 See Alghazouli, 517 F.3d at 1187 (holding that the term law in the smuggling statute includes 
a regulation only if Congress has specified that a violation of that regulation would be a crime). 
 68 See id. at 1187 (finding, after analyzing the history and structure of the smuggling statute 
compared to 18 U.S.C. § 554, that Congress did not intend the word law in the smuggling statute to 
include all regulations). 
 69 See id. at 1184–86 (examining the Supreme Court’s treatment of criminal convictions for 
violations of a regulation under the Tariff Act of 1866) (citing United States v. Eaton, 144 U.S. 677 
(1892); United States v. Grimmaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911)). 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. at 1186 (finding that Congress’s awareness of the findings in Eaton and Grimmaud at the 
time the smuggling statute was re-enacted indicates the legislature’s intention that a law only includes 
a regulation when the statute specified that a violation of that regulation was a crime). 
 72 Id. at 1186–87. 
 73 18 U.S.C. § 554; see Alghazouli, 517 F.3d at 1186–87 (comparing the smuggling statute to 18 
U.S.C. § 554). 
 74 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 554 (“Whoever fraudulently or knowingly exports or sends from the 
United States . . . any merchandise, article, or object contrary to any law or regulation of the United 
States . . .”), with 18 U.S.C. § 545 (“Whoever fraudulently or knowingly imports or brings into the 
United States, any merchandise contrary to law . . .”) (emphasis added). 
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should be construed narrowly so as to only include regulations if there is a 
statute that specifies that violation of that regulation is a crime.75 
C. The Eleventh Circuit’s Divergence from Prior Rulings  
on the Smuggling Statute 
The Eleventh Circuit found the respective approaches of the Fourth 
and Ninth Circuits flawed for the purposes of answering the question pre-
sented in Izurieta.76 The Eleventh Circuit noted that the Fourth Circuit’s 
interpretation of the meaning of a law aligned with that of the former Fifth 
Circuit, which split into the current Fifth and Eleventh Circuits and whose 
decisions are binding on the Eleventh Circuit.77 The Eleventh Circuit was 
concerned though by the far-reaching implications of the Fourth Circuit’s 
approach in light of the fact that the test the court adopted from Chrysler 
Corp. was derived from a non-criminal context.78 The Eleventh Circuit was 
similarly concerned with the breadth of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Al-
ghazouli and was unconvinced by the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of the smug-
gling statute’s legislative history.79 Despite the close relationship between 
the nature of the conduct criminalized by § 554 and the smuggling statute, 
the Eleventh Circuit found the Alghazouli court’s statutory comparison of 
these two offenses inappropriate because § 554 was enacted decades after 
the smuggling statute.80 
The finding that the regulation at issue in Izurieta had not specifically 
been addressed in any cases discussing the smuggling statute motivated the 
Eleventh Circuit’s rejection of the approaches of the Fourth and Ninth Cir-
cuits.81 Further, the Eleventh Circuit found that an adoption of the broad hold-
ings of either Mitchell or Alghazouli was unnecessary to answer the question 
                                                                                                                           
 75 Alghazouli, 517 F.3d at 1187. 
 76 See Izurieta, 710 F.3d at 1181 (finding the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Alghazouli unpersua-
sive and the Fourth Circuit’s ruling in Mitchell too broad to settle the dispute at issue in Izurieta). 
 77 Id. The Eleventh Circuit was established in 1981 pursuant to the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals Reorganization Act of 1980. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, 96 
Pub. L. No. 452, 94 Stat. 1994, 1994 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 41). Upon the Eleventh Circuit’s incep-
tion, the former Fifth Circuit was divided into the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits. Id. In 1981, the Elev-
enth Circuit held that decisions of the former Fifth Circuit serve as binding precedent in the Eleventh 
Circuit. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981). 
 78 See Izurieta, 710 F.3d at 1181 (rejecting the approach of the Fourth Circuit in Mitchell in 
favor of a narrower analysis with implications affecting only the regulation at issue in Izurieta). 
 79 See id. (finding the Ninth Circuit’s comparison of the smuggling statute and 18 U.S.C. § 554 
unconvincing in light of the fact that the smuggling statute was enacted decades before 18 U.S.C. 
§ 554). 
 80 Id. 
 81 See id. (noting that the regulation at issue in Izurieta had not been discussed in prior rulings 
focusing on the smuggling statute). 
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in Izurieta.82 The Eleventh Circuit instead found that the smuggling statute’s 
effect in criminalizing conduct with otherwise civil repercussions in Izurieta 
made the rule of lenity particularly applicable to the defendants in that case.83 
III. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT MISAPPLIED THE RULE OF LENITY IN IZURIETA 
The rule of lenity is a rule of last resort in statutory interpretation, re-
served for instances in which statutory ambiguity remains after a court has 
attempted to deduce legislative intent from all other available means.84 In 
2013, in United States v. Izurieta, the Eleventh Circuit applied the rule of 
lenity after finding the smuggling statute’s contrary to law provision griev-
ously ambiguous.85 Section A of this Part argues that the Eleventh Circuit 
improperly employed the rule of lenity by resorting to the rule before apply-
ing all other means of statutory interpretation.86 Section B argues that the 
existing circuit split over the smuggling statute’s contrary to law provision 
does not have such significant practical implications as to require immedi-
ate redress from the Supreme Court or Congress.87 
A. The Eleventh Circuit Failed to Employ Traditional Means of Statutory 
Interpretation Before Applying the Rule of Lenity 
The central requirement in applying the rule of lenity is a finding of 
statutory ambiguity.88 Grave statutory ambiguity, however, is not alone suf-
ficient for the court to apply the rule.89 Nor is a statute sufficiently ambigu-
ous for the purposes of applying the rule of lenity if courts of like authority 
are split in their interpretation of the statute in question. 90 The rule of lenity 
                                                                                                                           
 82 Id. 
 83 See id. at 1181–82 (finding that lenity is a concern for the court in criminal cases such as Izur-
ieta where a regulation with civil penalties could be transformed into a criminal law). 
 84 See Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990) (finding that resort to the rule of lenity 
is reserved for instances in which doubt exists about a statute’s intended scope even after examining 
the language, structure, and legislative history of the statute); Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 
587, 596 (1961) (finding that the rule of lenity is applied at the end of the process of statutory inter-
pretation, not at the beginning, as a means of offering a defendant leniency). 
 85 See United States v. Izurieta, 710 F.3d 1176, 1181 (11th Cir. 2013) (finding the contrary to 
law provision as it pertains to 19 C.F.R. § 141.113(c)(3) (2017) grievously ambiguous and applying 
the rule of lenity). 
 86 See infra notes 88–110 and accompanying text. 
 87 See infra notes 111–122 and accompanying text. 
 88 See Moskal, 498 U.S. at 107 (finding that statutory ambiguity is the “touchstone of the rule of 
lenity”). 
 89 See Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 239 (1993) (holding that the mere possibility of 
narrower statutory construction is not sufficient to warrant the application of the rule of lenity). 
 90 See Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 64 (1995) (holding that a statute is not ambiguous for the 
purposes of lenity solely because there is an existing division of authority). 
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is only applied if grievous ambiguity remains after the court has consulted 
all traditional canons of statutory construction.91 Courts are required to ex-
haust all means of traditional statutory construction before applying the rule 
of lenity in recognition of the court’s role to interpret, not direct, congres-
sional will.92 As a result, courts apply the rule of lenity at the end of the 
process of statutory interpretation to resolve statutory ambiguity, not in the 
beginning of the process as a means to offer leniency to a defendant.93 
The Eleventh Circuit found the approaches of the Fourth and Ninth 
Circuits in United States v. Mitchell, in 1994, and United States v. Al-
ghazouli, in 2008, respectively, inapplicable to the regulation at issue in 
Izurieta.94 The Eleventh Circuit instead applied the rule of lenity after find-
ing the contrary to law provision grievously ambiguous.95 The Eleventh 
Circuit erred, however, by failing to apply available means of statutory con-
struction before finding the contrary to law provision in the smuggling stat-
ute grievously ambiguous.96 
Citing the Supreme Court’s 1991 decision in Chapman v. United States,  
the Eleventh Circuit stated that the rule of lenity should only apply where a 
criminal statute contains a grievous ambiguity.97 A complete reading of the 
sentence in Chapman quoted by the Eleventh Circuit, however, reveals that 
the Eleventh Circuit omitted a crucial element of the Court’s holding in 
Chapman.98 The Court found in Chapman that the rule of lenity applies only 
if a statute remains grievously ambiguous even after the court has applied all 
other available means to interpret the statute.99 Not only did the Eleventh Cir-
                                                                                                                           
 91 See Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 474, 488 (2010) (holding that that the rule of lenity only 
applies if a grievous ambiguity remains after the court has applied traditional means of statutory 
interpretation such that the court must “guess as to what Congress intended”) (quoting Bifulco v. 
United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387 (1980)); Moskal, 498 U.S. at 108 (finding that resort to the rule of 
lenity is reserved for instances in which doubt exists about a statute’s intended scope after examining 
the statute using traditional canons of statutory construction). 
 92 See Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 831 (1974) (holding that furtherance of the 
principles underlying the rule of lenity should not eclipse the understanding that rules of statutory 
interpretation exist to discern and not guide congressional will). 
 93 See supra notes 84–89 (describing the appropriate application of the rule of lenity).  
 94 Izurieta, 710 F.3d at 1181. 
 95 Id. 
 96 See id. at 1181–82 (finding that “lenity remains an important concern in criminal cases” but 
failing to analyzing the text, legislative history, or structure of the smuggling statute’s contrary to law 
provision). 
 97 Id. at 1182. 
 98 Compare id. (“The rule is a limited one, however, applying only where there is a ‘grievous 
ambiguity or uncertainty’in the statute.”), with Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 463 (1991) 
(“The rule of lenity, however, is not applicable unless there is a ‘grievous ambiguity in the language 
and structure of the Act,’ such that even after the court has ‘seized everything from which can be 
derived,’ it is still ‘left with an ambiguous statute.’”) (citations omitted). 
 99 Chapman, 500 U.S. at 463. 
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cuit omit Chapman’s holding regarding the need to first exhaust all forms of 
traditional statutory interpretation before resorting to lenity, the court also 
failed to address this well-founded requirement of the rule of lenity at all.100 
In contrast, in Mitchell, the Fourth Circuit cited Chapman in finding that the 
rule of lenity does not apply unless a grievous ambiguity remains after the 
court has looked at the language, structure, and legislative history of the stat-
ute in question.101 The Fourth Circuit found that the smuggling statute was 
not ambiguous and that the rule of lenity was inapplicable after examining the 
plain text of the statute and the term law in particular.102 
The Eleventh Circuit’s error in failing to first apply other methods of 
statutory construction before resorting to the rule of lenity led the court to 
focus primarily on determining whether the smuggling statute is grievously 
ambiguous.103 Without citing to prior authority, the court held that lack of 
reference in the smuggling statute to regulations creates an ambiguity that 
should be considered grievous if the ambiguity criminalizes conduct that 
would otherwise only give rise to civil penalties.104 This finding led the 
court to scrutinize the regulation at issue, 19 C.F.R. § 141.113(c)(3), rather 
than the smuggling statute itself.105 The court examined the legislative his-
tory of the regulation and related statutes concerning the conditional release 
protocol for imported goods to determine that the regulation is a law with 
only civil implications.106 As a result, the court reasoned that the smuggling 
statute, at least as it pertains to the regulation at issue in Izurieta, met the 
standard of grievously ambiguous required by the rule of lenity.107 
The practical impact of the court’s error in prematurely applying the 
rule of lenity may have been negligible—even if the court had conducted its 
own analysis of the text, structure, and legislative history of the smuggling 
                                                                                                                           
 100 Izurieta, 710 F.3d at 1181–82; see supra notes 84–89 and accompanying text (describing the 
appropriate application of the rule of lenity). 
 101 See United States v. Mitchell, 39 F.3d 465, 470 (4th Cir. 1994) (declining to apply the rule of 
lenity after finding the smuggling statute unambiguous) (citing Chapman, 500 U.S. at 463).  
 102 Id. at 468, 470. 
 103 See Izurieta, 710 F.3d at 1182–84 (holding that the smuggling statute is grievously ambigu-
ous for the purposes of lenity by primarily analyzing the legislative history of the regulation at issue 
and not the contrary to law provision in the smuggling statute). 
 104 See id. at 1182 (noting that ambiguity in the smuggling statute with regards to regulations 
should be considered grievous ambiguity if such an ambiguity could result in criminalizing otherwise 
civil conduct). 
 105 See id. at 1182–84 (examining whether a violation of § 141.113(c)(3) under the smuggling 
statute gives rise to a criminal punishment where a defendant could only have reasonably anticipated 
civil penalties). 
 106 See id. (finding that § 141.113(c)(3) primarily establishes contractual terms between customs 
and importers and that a defendant could only reasonably anticipate civil penalties resulting from a 
violation of the regulation). 
 107 Id. 
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statute, it may have found the statute grievously ambiguous and applied the 
rule of lenity anyway.108 The rule of lenity, however, is a rule of last resort 
in statutory interpretation because it offers the court an opportunity to dic-
tate, where it might otherwise interpret, legislative intent.109 By prematurely 
applying the rule, the Eleventh Circuit overstepped its role as an interpreter 
of legislative authority.110 
B. Relatively Immaterial Impact of Divided Authority over Smuggling 
Statute Likely to Leave Circuit Split Unresolved 
Following the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Izurieta, three federal cir-
cuits have reached different conclusions regarding what constitutes a law as 
defined by the smuggling statute.111 Although the Eleventh Circuit tacitly 
endorsed the Fourth Circuit’s approach in Mitchell in some circumstances, 
stating that the Mitchell court’s analysis may reflect congressional intent in 
some cases, the Eleventh Circuit diverged from the Fourth Circuit.112 The 
resulting division of authority has the potential to create uncertainty for in-
dividuals and importers regarding what regulations, if any, can serve as the 
underlying basis for an indictment under the smuggling statute.113 This po-
tential for uncertainty is evident when considering the fluidity of interna-
tional transportation and commerce in the United States, where many U.S. 
gateways to international markets, such as airports with international ser-
vice and ports engaged in international shipping, are located outside of the 
jurisdiction of the Fourth, Ninth, or Eleventh Circuits.114 
                                                                                                                           
 108 Id. 
 109 See supra notes 84–89 and accompanying text (describing the appropriate application of the 
rule of lenity).  
 110 See Huddleston, 415 U.S. at 831 (holding that furtherance of the principles underlying the 
rule of lenity should not lead the court to direct where it otherwise might interpret congressional 
authority); supra notes 84–89 and accompanying text (describing the appropriate application of the 
rule of lenity). 
 111 Izurieta, 710 F.3d 1176, 1182–84; United States v. Alghazouli, 517 F.3d 1179, 1187 (9th Cir. 
2008); Mitchell, 39 F.3d 465, 470–71. 
 112 See Izurieta, 710 F.3d at 1181 (concluding that the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation of a law in 
Mitchell as including any regulation having the force and effect of law may reflect the intent of Con-
gress in some instances). 
 113 See supra notes 4–12 and accompanying text (outlining the existing circuit split regarding the 
smuggling statute). 
 114 See U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., PORT PERFORMANCE FREIGHT STATISTICS PROGRAM: ANNUAL 
REPORT TO CONGRESS 7 (2016), https://www.bts.gov/sites/bts.dot.gov/files/docs/PPFS_Annual_
Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/R4WN-LGTK] [hereinafter PORT PERFORMANCE STATISTICS] (listing 
the top twenty-five largest ports in the United States in 2016 by total tonnage); U.S. DEP’T OF 
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Although a split between the Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits over 
the smuggling statute indicates a lack of uniformity regarding this particular 
federal statute, conflict between circuits is not necessarily a problem for the 
federal judiciary or individuals likely to be impacted by the statute in ques-
tion.115 Congress first directed the study of inter-circuit conflicts in 1972, 
and the issue was studied again in 1990 by the Federal Courts Study Com-
mittee (the “Committee”).116 The Committee focused its attention on inter-
circuit conflicts it deemed “intolerable” and noted that many of the direct 
inter-circuit conflicts rejected by the Supreme Court did not meet this clas-
sification.117 An intolerable conflict can be distinguished from those that are 
merely “undesirable” or simply “insignificant.”118 An inter-circuit conflict 
is intolerable if it results in any or all of the following: (1) economic costs 
or harm to multi-circuit actors, such as firms engaged in interstate com-
merce; (2) forum shopping among circuits; (3) unfairness to litigants in dif-
ferent circuits; and (4) the encouragement of “non-acquiescence” by federal 
administrative agencies by forcing agencies to choose between judicial au-
thority in their respective circuits and the uniform administration of stat-
utes.119 
In practice, the existing division of authority in the Fourth, Ninth, and 
Eleventh Circuits over what constitutes a law under the smuggling statute 
                                                                                                                           
7X5P] (listing the top forty U.S. international country “passenger gateways” to the world in 2016, 
ranked by scheduled service). In 2016, nine of the top twenty-five largest U.S. ports by total tonnage 
fell within the jurisdiction of the Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits. PORT PERFORMANCE STATIS-
TICS, supra. In the same year, thirteen of the largest twenty-five U.S. international airports by pas-
senger service fell within the jurisdiction of the Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits. Id. 
 115 See Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1589–90, 1605–06 (2008) 
(arguing that the effects of non-uniformity of federal law are not, on the whole, problematic); Arthur 
D. Hellman, Precedent Unbound: The Nature and Extent of Unresolved Intercircuit Conflicts, 56 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 693, 726–27 (1995) (distinguishing between circuit conflicts that are “intolerable” from 
those that are “undesirable” or merely “insignificant”). 
 116 Hellman, supra note 115, at 695–96. The Commission on Revision of the Federal Court 
Appellate System (the “Commission”) was established in 1972 in response to the growing case load 
facing federal courts and the inability of the Supreme Court to resolve increasing division among the 
federal courts of appeal; the Commission unsuccessfully advocated for the establishment of a nation-
al court of appeals to aid in resolving the increasing uncertainty allegedly resulting from growing 
inconsistency in law between the federal circuits. Id. The issue was studied again in 1990 by the 
Federal Courts Study Committee (the “Committee”). Id. The Committee found that the Supreme 
Court reviewed fewer than 1% of all federal appeals in 1989 and predicted that percentage to de-
crease as the number of appeals rose. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY 
COMMITTEE 124–25 (1990). 
 117 See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 116 (recommending that the Federal Judicial Center 
study the number and frequency of inter-circuit conflicts that meet the criteria of an intolerable con-
flict yet remain unresolved). 
 118 Hellman, supra note 115, at 726–27. 
 119 FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 116, at 125. 
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impacts a narrow group of individuals and importers.120 Only those who 
have violated or may violate a regulation that could serve as the underlying 
charge for an indictment under the smuggling statute are practically affected 
by the existing circuit split over the smuggling statute.121 In light of this 
narrow impact, the inconsistency between the Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh 
Circuits regarding the smuggling statute likely does not meet the standard 
of an intolerable circuit conflict as defined by the Committee.122 
CONCLUSION 
The Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have come to different con-
clusions regarding what regulations are included within the meaning of a 
law under the smuggling statute, a criminal offense for smuggling goods 
into the United States. In diverging with the approaches taken by the Fourth 
and Ninth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit in Izurieta found the smuggling 
statute to be grievously ambiguous as it pertained to the regulation underly-
ing the indictment in the case. The court’s application of the rule of lenity in 
this case was premature. 
The rule of lenity is a rule of last resort in statutory interpretation, re-
served for instances in which a statute remains ambiguous even after the 
court has applied all available means to determine congressional intent. In 
this case, the Eleventh Circuit applied the rule of lenity to the detriment of 
well-founded methods of statutory interpretation, overstepping its role as an 
interpreter rather than an administrator of congressional will. The practical 
impact of the Eleventh Circuit’s decision and the existing inter-circuit con-
flict, however, is negligible. Inconsistency among the Fourth, Ninth, and 
Eleventh Circuits regarding the smuggling statute affects a narrow group of 
individuals and minimally burdens the federal judiciary. 
C. ALEX DILLEY 
Preferred Cite: C. Alex Dilley, Eleventh Circuit Prematurely Applied the Rule of Lenity in United 
States v. Izurieta, 59 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. 554 (2018), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/
vol59/iss9/554/. 
                                                                                                                           
 120 See supra notes 4–12 and accompanying text (outlining the existing circuit split regarding the 
smuggling statute). 
 121 See supra notes 4–12 and accompanying text (outlining the existing circuit split regarding the 
smuggling statute). 
 122 FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 116, at 125; see supra notes 4–12 and accompanying text 
(outlining the existing circuit split regarding the smuggling statute). 
